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Abstract
In Korea’s high-growth economy, the Bank ofKorea had been willing to tolerate double-
digit inflation, provided that it remained at ‘non-explosive’ levels. In this article, we estimate a
monetary policy feedback rule for Korea and find that the upper threshold oftolerable inflation
for the Bank of Korea was about 20 percent. It appears that the Bank of Korea’s disciplined,
rule-like approach to monetary policy was able to control inflation and keep it away from
explosive levels, despite the well-know empirical regularity that inflation becomes more variable
at higher levels. After 1983, however, our regime-switching model suggests that the inflation
target has been six percent. We also find little evidence that the Bank ofKorea has targeted real
growth, except for a period in the mid-1980s when industrial production growth suggested that
the economy was overheating, relative to an implicit growth target of7.4 percent. We conclude
with a discussion of possible reasons for Korea to choose to stabilize inflation at lower levels
since the mid-1980s.
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Introduction
In response to the growing consensus in favor of price stability as the primary goal
of monetary policy, economists have proposed a number of feedback mechanisms aimed
at committing policy to a long-run nominal target [McCallum (1988, 1994); Judd and
Motley (1993)]. The proposed feedback mechanisms prescribe changes in an operating
target variable that the central bank can control. Much empirical work has concentrated
on simulations of feedback rules in order to learn about their properties [McCaIlum (1988,
1994); Judd and Motley (1993)]. The procedure can be inverted, however, to use policy
feedback rules as models of policy and the associated data [Dueker and Fischer (1996)]. In
this article, we use a feedback rule to examine the implicit policy targets of the Bank of
Korea and to examine whether Korean monetary policy behaved in a disciplined, rule-like
manner, even though its implicit inflation target was well above the levels seen in other
countries that have explicit inflation targets.
The Bank of Korea’s delicate mission for the first half of our 1973-95 sample was to
allow rapid growth in domestic credit to foster growth, while keeping inflation just below an
explosive level at which inflation could easily spiral upward to hyperinflation. In general,
monetary policy in Korea has been encharged with accommodating Korea’s impressive
growth, even to the point of shepherding growth in targeted sectors by using its influence
on private banks to direct loans and investment capital. As the Korean economy developed,
government policymakers recognized that sustained growth would require a more advanced
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and less regulated financial system. In addition, an efficient financial system would only
evolve in~tnenvironment of lower inflation, below double digits. Our results suggest that
Korea’s monetary policy was perhaps surprisingly disciplined and rule-like in pursuit of
objectives that underwent a transition to lower inflation in the early to middle 1980s.
The next sections briefly review strategies and institutional detail for the Bank of Korea.
The subsequent sections present the empirical model and results.
Strategies of the Bank of Korea
For the past 50 years, the Bank of Korea has consistently concerned itself with foste-
ring Korea’s rapid economic growth and development [Bank ofKorea (1995)]. Towards this
end, however, the contribution of monetary policy has alternated between accommodati-
ve and stabilizing stances with respect to price inflation. In this period, monetary policy
did not use the exchange rate as an indicator variable, because the exchange rate was not
market-determined but controlled by the authorities to prevent undesired exchange rate
appreciations from making Korean exports less competitive in the world market. During
the late 1950s, monetary policies were aimed at alleviating the high inflation rates that
prevailed after the Korean War. From the early 1960s when the first economic develop-
ment plan began, monetary policy was frequently used to speed up economic growth by
increasing the growth rate of the money supply and directing financial resources to targeted
sectors in export industries. In the 1970s, especially, the government encouraged hurried
expansion in the heavy and chemical industries to sustain a high rate of economic growth.
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Monetary authorities in this period were deeply involved in mobilizing financial resources
to accommodate large rates of investment in these industries [Bank of Korea (1992)]. One
reason for the high inflation seen in Korea was that Korea often experienced large current
account surpluses that the Bank of Korea could hardly offset to prevent rapid growth in
the money supply [Bank of Korea (1990)]. Because of the high resulting inflation, financial
deregulation was postponed.
The export-oriented growth strategy of the 1960s and 1970s led to high inflation and
the realization that such levels of monetary stimulus actually undermined the country’s ca-
pacity utilization and financial development. Moreover, the second oil shock in 1979 drove
Korean economy into stagflation. At the stage of the economy’s development in the early
1980s, the Korean government recognized that sustained growth would require financial
liberalization, and lower inflation was essential for successful financial liberalization. Thus,
although sustainable economic growth remained the chief goal of overall economic policy,
price stabilization became the best contribution that monetary policy could make. It is ge-
nerally acknowledged that financial deregulation and the opening of financial markets have
enhanced Korea’s market mechanisms since the mid-1980s. During the 1980s, all existing
commercial banks were privatized and some new commercial banks received charters. In-
terest rate liberalization progressed and the domestic stock market was partially opened to
foreign investors in the early 1990s. Reflecting the change in monetary policy objectives in
Korea from economic growth to price stabilization, the growth rate of money supply was
much lower in the 1980s than in the 1960s and 1970s, as shown in Figure 1.
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In order to tackle the problem of high inflation while accommodating rapid economic
growth, the Bank of Korea has adopted monetary targeting. A target growth rate for
M2 has been set at the beginning of each year since 1979.1 Since interest rates were not
market-determined until Korea began to pursue interest rate liberalization in 1991, they
were not good indicators of the stance ofmonetary policy.2 For most of the post-war period,
credit was rationed, with interest rates held below market-clearing levels. But non-price
credit rationing has been fading and interest rates have become a more important tool of
monetary control in recent years.
From 1979 to 1985, the target growth rate of M2 continued to decrease from 25% to
9.5%, bringing a substantial tightening in monetary policy. Subsequently the M2 target
rate was raised to 16-18% during the period of hugh current account surplus (1986-1989),
but has gradually been reduced to 12-16% in 1995. The target growth rate for M2 has been
determined largely by the European Community method of using estimates ofpotential real
growth, unavoidable near-term inflation and expected velocity growth and deriving implied
money growth from the equation of exchange.3 Table 1 shows how close actual M2 growth
has been to the target rates since 1979. With the exception of 1983 and 1984, actual M2
‘Monetary targeting formally began in 1976 when the Bank of Korea announced growth targets for Ml.
Before that time, the Bank also had to agree to targets for growth in the monetary base and domestic
credit as part of Stand-By credit agreements with the International Monetary Fund, but these did not
guide monetary policy actions operationally.
2Barro and Lee (1994) argue, however, that Korean interest rates nevertheiss fluctuated around equili-
brium levels, based on the reduced-form regressions they study.
3For example, the 1995 M2 target growth rate of 12-16% was calculated based on an assumption of 7%
real growth, 5% unavoidable inflation, and a decline in velocity of 2%. In recent years, the target range
has been widened due to increased uncertainty about the effects of financial market liberalization and the
opening of the country’s capital markets.
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growth has been within or above the target range. In the early 1980s, M2 growth targets
were set ~bove 20% to counteract the economic recession. In the middle of the 1980s, the
central bank did not completely sterilize the monetary expansion resulting from the large
accummulation of current account surplus.
Table 1: Official Target and Actual
M2 Growth Rates in Korea
year Target Actual
1979 25 24.6
1980 20(25) 27.0
1981 25 25.2
1982 20-22(25) 27.0
1983 18-20(15) 14.7
1984 11-13 8.9
1985 9.5 13.9
1986 12-14(16-18) 17.4
1987 15-18 22.5
1988 15-18 18.8
1989 15-18 18.4
1990 15-19 21.2
1991 17-19 18.3
1992 18.5 18.6
1993 13-17 17.3
1994 14-17 17.6
1995 12-16 13.7
Intra-year revisions to targets
are in parentheses______
The fact that actual M2 growth has not been particularly constrained by the target
ranges set at the beginning of each year suggests that the money supply has responded to
intra-year developments, perhaps in a manner akin to the feedback mechanism we present
in the next section.
Institutional Details for the Bank of Korea
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Several features of the way the Bank of Korea has conducted monetary policy helped
determine which variable we used as the policy information variable for Korea. First,
interest rates were not market determined for the early part of our sample period. While
financial liberalization has progressed rapidly in recent years, interest rates do not provide
a reliable guide to policy actions early in our sample, because they were not market-clearing
interest rates. Private banks, sometimes under consultation with the Bank of Korea, would
ration loan demand at prevailing rates. In this way, investment flowed to favored sectors
at susidized, below market-clearing, rates and, therefore, interest rates do not provide a
consistent measure of the stance of monetary policy. A second possibility, the monetary
base or reserves, was ruled out because reserve requirement changes have been relatively
frequent in Korea. To some extent, the Bank of Korea has used reserve requirement changes
as a valve to adjust the flow of profits to the banking sector. Our chosen measure of policy
information is the monetary aggregate M2. Given that bank loans are the assets that
correspond with the banks’ deposit liabilities that enter M2, and that bank lending and
M2 respond to interest rate pressures, reserve requirement tax pressures and moral suasion
from the cental bank, M2 growth appears to be the best summary measure expressing the
intentions of the Bank of Korea.
An Empirical Model of Korean Monetary Policy
In our empirical work, we assume that the Bank of Korea steers M2 growth with inflation
as its ultimate nominal target. In this case forecasts of real money demand provide an
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important link between the operating target and the policy objective. We use a time-
varying coefficient model based on the Kalman filter to generate plausible one-step-ahead
forecasts. A few words about our use of externally generated forecasts versus internal (and
unavailable) Bank of Korea forecasts are in order. Since we do not have internal Bank of
Korea forecasts and because the Bank of Korea may not even have had specific inflation
targets for all years, we cannot claim to be uncovering explicit Bank of Korea inflation
targets with our model. We can say, however, that our use of reasonable, technically
sophisticated forecasts gives us sound inferences regarding implicit policy objectives of the
Bank of Korea. Central banks, regardless of their internal targets and objectives, remain
cognizant of the implicit signals they send with respect to their inflation tolerances in that
the public can ascribe observed money growth rates to likely inflation outcomes through
such forecasts. The parameters corresponding with the implicit inflation targets in our
empirical model represent these likely inflation outcomes that the public, including the
central bank, would expect to result from the chosen monetary policy.
It should also be noted that our Kalman filter forecasts use data only up to the current
date in estimating the coefficient values, in contrast to OLS coefficients which embody
sample-wide information. In addition to a current-period inflation target, our model allows
for the possibility that monetary policy responds to a deviation in the price level from an
implicit target price level and also to a deviation in the industrial production index and an
implicit target level. As discussed above, monetary policy cannot achieve arbitrary targets
for real variables, such as industrial production, in the long run, but monetary policy
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can take short-term feedback from real variables. We included feedback from industrial
production, because the Bank of Korea has shown concern not only with helping to sustain
Korea’s high growth rate, but also with stabilizing some of the volatility in the growth
rate. Since monetary policy cannot choose arbitrary targets for real variables in the long
run, our model feedback mechanism allows the industrial production index to have an
implicit target, where the target is adjusted gradually to accommodate actual long-run
developments.
We note M2 growth as /.~lnM2,the price level as P, a forecast of growth in real M2
demand as z~ln(M/P),the target inflation rate as ~, the industrial production index as IP
and the desired price level and industral production level as P and IF, respectively.4 We
use a monthly sample that covers 1973-95. The parameters in our model switch over time
according to three state variables that follow independent first-order Markov processes:
Si e {0, i}; S2 E {0, i}; S3 ~ {0, 1}.
Parameter dependence on these state variables is indicated by placing the appropriate state
variable in parentheses following the parameter. The feedback mechanism we use to model
Korean monetary policy is
4All data used in this article were supplied by the Bank of Korea.
9
~1nM2 = )~o(Si~)+ L~.1n(M/P)t1t_i+ .Ai(Sit)(lnP~_i— lnPt_i)
+A2(S2t)(lnIPt~i— 1nIP~_i)+ ~ (1)
The variance of the error term is not assumed to be constant to reflect the fact that the
model will not describe the data with equal precision in all time periods:
var(ft) = cr2(53)
The target paths for the price level and industrial production index evolve according to
equations (2) and (4):
Target Price Level: lnP~(Sit) .A.0(511) + 51(Si~)1nP~_1+ (1 — ~i(Si~))1nP~_i, (2)
Expected target: ln~ = ~Prob(Sit = i Yt)lnP~(Sit= i), (3)
Target md. Prod: 1riITi~P(S2~)= ,i(S2~)+ 82(S2~)lnIP~~i+ (1 62(S2~))1nIP~_1,(4)
Expected target: lnIP~ = ~Prob(S2~ = j }~)1mIP~(S21= j). (5)
The variables ~ and 17~are, respectively, the target price level and the target level for the
industrial production index conditional on particular values of the markov state variables.
The expected values are derived by integrating out the current values of the state variables.
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Rebasing of the target level occurs for values of 5j, 82 < 1. Consequently, one-time shifts in
the price level are gradually accommodated into the target path. As 8 decreases from one,
the degree to which the target level is allowed to drift to accommodate recent developments
increases. McCallum (1993) has used an analogous weighting scheme; however, in his model
5~remains constant.
Because of the autoregressive nature of equations (2) and (4), inferences of the state
at time t would depend on the entire history of past realizations of the state variables
if it were not for the collapsing procedure shown in equations (3) and (5). Kim (1994)
provides the justification for the collapsing procedure and notes that its use introduces
a small approximation to the evaluation of the likelihood function in a markov-switching
model. He finds, however, that the approximation does not materially affect the calculated
value of the likelihood function or the parameter estimates.
The three Markov processes are assumed to undergo transitions between their states
independently from each other for reasons of tractability. In this case, the transition pro-
babilities can be summarized as
Prob.(Slt = 0 Sit—i = 0) = Pi
Prob.(Slt = 1 Sit—i = 1) = q1
Prob.(S2t = 0 S2~_~= 0) = P2
Prob.(S2t = 1 S2t~= 1) = q~
Prob.(S3t = 0 S3~_~= 0) = P3
Prob.(S3t = 1 S3~1= 1) = q3
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Note that without the independence assumption, we would have to estimate 64 tran-
sition probabilities instead of six. The unconditional value of Si = 0, for example, is
1—gi
2—pi—qi
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters are obtained by maximizing the log
of the expected likelihood or
in(~~ Prob. (Sit = i, S2~= j, S3~= k i)L~’3~~) (6)
t=1 i=Oj=Ok=O
where Y~4is information available through time t — 1 and the student-t densities are
= lnF(.5(n + 1)) — lnF(.5n) — .51n(7rna2(S3t = k))
-.5(n + i)ln (1+ ~(Si~~Sz =i)~) (7)
and F is the gamma function.
Empirical Results for Korea
The two-state Markov switching characterization of the Bank of Korea’s implicit infla-
tion target uncovers estimates of six percent inflation in the low state and slightly greater
than twenty percent in the high state.5 Table 2 contains the full set of parameter estimates
‘Note that the two-state characterization is not as restrictive as it might first appear, because the states
are only inferred probabilistically. Thus, the inferred inflation target can lie anywhere between six and
twenty percent, depending on the filtered probability of being in the low-inflation state.
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for the model and Figure 1 shows the probability-weighted inferred inflation target with
a one-year moving average of actual inflation. The Bank of Korea has been in the low-
inflation state since the early i980s, in conformity with the world-wide disinflation. For
a period in the mid-i980s, actual inflation remained substantially under six percent. Our
estimates suggest that part of this differential in the mid-1980s may have resulted from
attempts to prevent the real economy from overheating. Figure 2 plots the probability of
being in the state in which money growth admits a low level (essentially zero) of feedback
from the industrial production index. The non-zero feedback state P~2(S2= 1) = .084)
pertained in the mid-1980s. Figure 3 shows that moderate feedback was taken when the
industrial production index was generally racing ahead of a path defined by a growth path
of ~(S2 = 1) = 7.4 percent. For this reason, we conclude that the mid-i980s represented
the only period in the sample when the Bank of Korea responded directly to concerns
that the Korean economy was overheating due to unsustainably fast growth in industrial
production.
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Table 2: Models of Inflation Targeting (eqns. 1-6): 1974:1-1994:12]
parameter Model 1
no restrictions
Model 2
restricted model
)~o(Si= 0)
inflation target: low state
6.86 6.86
(1.08)
)~o(Si= 1)
inflation target: high state
20.14 20.14
(1.61)
= 0)
price_level_feedback
i.3E-7 set to zero
= 1)
price_level_feedback
7.8E-6 set to zero
8~(S1= 0)
price_target_drift
.247 N.A.
= 1)
price_target_drift
.195 N.A.
~S2 = 0)
md. prod._growth_target:_low_state
2.2E-6 0
= 1)
md. prod. growth target: high state
7.43 7.43
(2.69)
= 0)
md. prod._feedback
1.3E-7 set to zero
)~.2(S2= 1)
md. prod. feedback
.084 .084
(.022)
= 0)
md. prod. target drift
.815 .815
(.076)
62(S2 = 1)
md. prod. target drift
.974 .974
(.036)
cr
2(S3 = 0)
low variance
.441 .441
(.129)
cx2(S3 = 1)
high variance
2.28 2.28
(.860)
Pi .990 .990
(.009)
q1 .996 .996(.005)
P2 .987 .987
(.011)
q2 .980 .980
(.016)
]~3 .833 .833
(.097)
q3 .665 .665
(.129)
Log-Likelihood 14-452.72 -452.73
No. of parameters 21 15
Note: Standard errors in parentheses for restricted model.
The parameter estimates of A~find no evidence of Korean monetary policy admitting
feedback~fromthe price level, which implies that the inflation rate is targeted period by
period. Figure 4 plots the filtered probability of the low volatility state. In this state, the
residual variance is low: a~= cx2(S3 = 0) = .441. The residual variance between monthly
M2 growth and the model-implied rate of M2 growth is about five times higher in the
high-variance state, o~= a2(S3 = 1) = 2.28. Figure 4 shows that high-volatility periods
are not persistent and are distributed quite evenly throughout the sample period.
Finally in Figure 5, we assess the fit of the feedback model in explaining Korea’s M2
growth. The estimation was carried out using monthly data, but for clarity the chart plots
year-over-year growth rates. The chart shows much wider swings in M2 growth prior to the
mid-1980s, after which M2 growth has settled at a mean rate near 15 percent. The model-
implied M2 growth rate declined more slowly than actual M2 growth in the disinflation
of the 1980s. We would expect, however, the model-based inferences to be conservative
when identifying major changes in the inflation target, given that the high-inflation state
is highly persistent, with q1 = .996. In this case, the model will have to see below-normal
inflation for a substantial period before concluding that the target rate of inflation has
fallen. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the inflation rate and money growth fell
more rapidly in 1983 than the Bank of Korea had expected. Table 1 shows the Bank of
Korea’s pre-set target M2 growth rates and the intra-year revisions to the targets, where
applicable. In 1983, the Bank of Korea expected M2 growth to be between 18 and 20
percent, but realized later that year that 15 percent would be appropriate.
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Conclusions
In this article we estimate a monetary policy feedback rule to describe Korean monetary
policy over the past 20 years. Our estimates for the implicit inflation target show that, prior
to the mid-1980s, monetary policy attempted to cap inflation at 20 percent, but undertook
little action to push the rate down when it was below 20 percent. Apparently the objective
was to keep the inflation rate from becoming explosively high, and this threshold was
operationally 20 percent. Since the 1980s, however, inflation has been maintained at a
level below 10 percent, with an implicit target of about 6 percent.
Given the dictum that inflation becomes more volatile at higher rates, Korea’s inflation
rate showed suprisingly little variation during the period when the inflation target was
about 20 percent. Much of the variation that did occur coincided with the twin oil shocks
that affected all the industrialized countries as well. Hence one policy implication of our
results is the claim that rule-like monetary policy can succeed in stabilizing inflation, even
at the supposedly unstable rate of 20 percent. This finding ought to encourage central
banks that are contemplating a commitment to inflation targeting at low rates of inflation,
where the rate is less volatile.
In addition, several interesting questions arise when one asks why the Bank of Korea
lowered the inflation target in the 1980s. First, was 20 percent inflation incompatible
with liberalized financial markets? Ottmar Issing of the Deutsche Bundesbank notes that
“Financial markets have become an important ally in implementing a stability-oriented
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monetary policy ... one might even go so far as to say that the high inflation rates of the
past destroyed the very basis of the existence of inflation by drawing the attention of the
financial markets to the dangers of an easier monetary policy.” [Issing 1996, pp. 290-91].
Of course, disinflation took place globally in the early 1980s, so more than Korea’s nascent
domestic financial markets were pointing towards disinflation. The influence of global
inflation trends on Korean inflation was clear in the 1970s, as the twin oil shocks affected
Korean inflation disproportionately. Second, was the liberalization of financial markets
necessary to sustain high growth rates as Korea’s economy matured and income levels
began to reach OECD levels? The answer to this question may well be affirmative, but our
findings suggest that the timing may have been opportune. The disinflation and financial
liberalization in the 1980s coincided with the only period in the sample when monetary
policy was concerned about an overheated economy. Thus, one might argue that the Bank
of Korea only acted to disinflate when the real economy had considerable momentum and
could best withstand a disinflation. Finally, one might ask whether grass-roots support for
low-inflation policies would have appeared spontaneously, as the Korean people acquired
more wealth to protect and invest.
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